Source: Stratfor. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110502-us-pakistani-relations-after-bin-laden-raid
The U.S. operation that killed Osama bin Laden early May 2 in Abottabad, Pakistan, is an example of the deep distrust between the United States and Pakistan in the war against al Qaeda. Bin Laden was not killed in the lawless tribal borderland between Afghanistan and Pakistan; he was living with family members in a large, highly secured compound about three hours by car from Islamabad, just down the road from the Pakistan Military Academy. Though details of the operation remain scarce, it is now known that the United States informed the Pakistani government of the operation only once its forces had exited Pakistani airspace — taking lessons from previous instances in which U.S. information sharing with Pakistan compromised operations against high-value targets.
Reports have indicated US heliborne forces were able to fly with impunity to a major military cantonment in the heart of Pakistan, without the latter detecting or intercepting them. This reinforces my oft repeated observation that CINC CENTCOM, and not the Pakistan Government, controls the air space over Pakistan. Control of air space over the theatre of operations is a pre-requisite for the US, especially as it has high value operational and logistic assets deployed in that theatre at Jacobabad, Malir, Karachi and Shamsi. Military control of air space implies that other entities must defer to air traffic restrictions imposed by the USAF to facilitate free overland operational (defensive and offensive flights).
Obviously, this applies to Pakistan’s numerous missile tests. Islamabad’s claims notwithstanding, Pakistan has surrendered its sovereign right to control air space over its territory.