<![CDATA[SASFOR - China Doctrine and Deployment]]>Sat, 13 Feb 2016 22:23:21 -0800Weebly<![CDATA[CHINA’S EVOLVING STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES: DOCTRINE, CONCEPT, FORCE-STRUCTURES & SYSTEMS- Part III]]>Mon, 20 May 2013 16:18:02 GMThttp://www.sasfor.com/china-doctrine-and-deployment/chinas-evolving-strategic-capabilities-doctrine-concept-force-structures-systems-part-iii
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Brigadier Vijai K Nair VSM [Retd]
Dr. Nair retired from the Indian Army in 1991 after 30 years service, having been awarded the VSM for distinguished service. Besides three tenures of combat duty, in service experience includes: instructor - Defence Services Staff College, command of an Independent Armoured Brigade; and, Deputy Director General Strategic Planning at the Directorate of Perspective Planning.


The international situation is currently undergoing profound and complex changes. The progress towards economic globalisation and a multi-polar world is irreversible, as is the advance towards informationisation of society”[i]

The Chinese Civil war culminated in 1949 in the victory of the Communists and the birth of the People’s Republic of China. The PLA “set a general guideline and objective of building outstanding, modernized and revolutionary armed forces. It built the Navy, the Air Force and other technical arms, and developed mechanised weaponry and equipment, as well as nuclear weapons for the purpose of self-defense.”[ii]

As recently as the 1980s the Peoples Liberation Army [PLA] operated on military doctrines that evolved during World War II and military means that preceded that war. It had become apparent to the Chinese leadership that the country’s political and economic evolution had far outstripped its military capacities engendering a credibility gap in the over all national power quotient that Beijing required to give it the means to play the role it expected to in the international fora. This perception was reflected in the White Paper: China’s National Defense in December 2004, which laid down that, “A major strategic task of the Communist Party of China [CPC] in exercising state power is to secure a coordinated development of national defense and economy, and to build modernized, regularized and revolutionary armed forces to keep the country safe.”[iii] In military terms Beijing “will promote coordinated development of firepower, mobility and information capability, enhance the development of its operational strength with priority given to the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and strengthen its comprehensive deterrence and war-fighting capabilities.”[iv]
This gave impetus to ongoing massive drive to modernise its conventional and strategic forces to levels comparable with the US that dominated East Asia – the Chinese backyard. While the military modernisation programme comprehensively covered the entire spectrum for equipment, structures and systems, doctrine and human resources that compromised the forces; the gap in strategic competencies has received special attention to offset US potential to interfere with China’s regional aspirations. "China is developing limited power-projection capabilities to deal with a range of possible conflict scenarios along its periphery, especially in maritime areas. The PLA is acquiring military capabilities designed to defend Chinese sovereignty and territorial interests and, in particular, to pose a credible threat to Taiwan in order to influence Taiwan’s choices about its political future;… These capabilities are also intended to deter, delay, or complicate U.S. efforts to intervene on behalf of Taiwan.”[i]

China’s immediate short and long term interests at the turn of the century extended to its registered territorial claims and disputes, to areas of immediate economic interest and to those parts of the world where it planned on increasing its political interaction as a short and mid term objective. This meant that the PRC over a period of time would project itself along the Pacific littoral states, ASEAN, the Indian Ocean, Africa, West Asia and the Central Asian Republics, where its national interests lay. Such initiatives in an incoherent geo-political and geo-strategic environment was bound to induce a conflict of interests with the major global and regional players that could, if not prepared, generate dangerous instabilities in the regional security environment with serious repercussions.

In the regional context, China was attempting to harmonise its political evolution with its unprecedented economic growth to ensure internal stability, address its territorial claims including culmination of its One China policy, disputed assets in the South China sea and, secure and consolidate the secessionist threat from ethnic elements in Xinjiang and Tibet. Beyond its claimed borders, the PRC would: cultivate the Central Asian States to avail of their abundant fossil fuel resources and to neutralise external interference in ethnically troubled Sinkiang; extend its political and economic influence to the region adjoining its Eastern coastal areas; and secure its sea lanes to and through the Malacca Straits for subsequent egress to the Indian Ocean.

In the global context the PRC’s endeavour is to counterbalance the influence of major powers in its immediate neighbourhood to allow its own writ to run unfettered; acquire and establish bases along the Indian Ocean littoral to safeguard its economic and political initiatives in West Asia and Africa; acquire adequate political and military muscle to support its initiatives in the international community to become a dominant player in global affairs; create policies and means to ensure the security of sea lanes critical for the access to energy resources; and, develop a strategic capability as a counterpoise to policies of containment that may be initiated against it. The major global players that would have a large part in shaping the international environment, and have a vital stake in the areas of interest to the PRC, are the US, the European Union [EU], Russia, Japan and India, each of whom has vital national interests along the periphery of the PRC that could be cause for friction.

All these initiatives would, in some manner or the other, impinge on the existing security environment of the Asia Pacific region. To ensure that the unavoidable mutations do not unbalance the security environment, regional and global powers would be constrained to re-shape associated policies that in turn would have a ripple effect creating new turbulence in a transient situation.

The writing on the wall was clear. The 21st century is headed for strategic turmoil amongst the primary centres of power. Most importantly the emerging global order is likely to fall under the shadow of the growing strategic rivalry that manifests the Sino-American equation. The fall out of this rivalry will permeate the entire global strategic ambiance generating managerial problems on all and sundry not the least of which would be the strategic concerns of the other Asian powers, India and Japan.

A decade into the 21st century these prophesies have materialised and Beijing revised its strategic perceptions that are articulated in a White Paper: China’s National Defense in 2010. Economic globalisation is changing the international balance of power through the economic strength and growing international status of emerging powers and developing countries. Consequently “the international security situation has become more complex. International strategic competition centering on international order, comprehensive national strength and geopolitics has intensifies. … In general, world peace remains elusive.”[ii] Security threats posed by such global challenges as terrorism, economic insecurity, climate change, nuclear proliferation, insecurity of information, natural disasters, public health concerns, transnational crime are on the rise.”[iii]

Of concern to Beijing are the “profound changes taking shape in the Asia-Pacific strategic landscape. Relevant major powers are increasing their strategic investment. The United States is reinforcing its regional military alliances, and increasing its involvement in regional security affairs.”[iv]

In keeping with this security perception China has revised the tasking of the PLA’.

The primary role is to: “Safeguarding national sovereignty, security and interests of national development. China’s national defense is tasked to guard against and resist aggression, defend the security of China’s lands, inland waters, territorial waters and airspace, safeguard its maritime rights and interests and maintain its security interests in space, electromagnetic space and cyberspace. It is also tasked to oppose and contain the separatist forces for “Taiwan independence,” crack down on separatist forces for “East Turkmenistan independence,” and “Tibetan independence,” and defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity. … China consistently upholds the policy of no first of nuclear weapons, adheres to a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.”[v]

Other roles include: Maintaining social harmony and stability; Accelerating the modernisation of national defense and armed forces; and, Maintaining world peace and stability.

Nuclear Imperatives

The other significant factor that will drive the Sino-American strategic competition is the striking focus on nuclear weapon capabilities based on novel threat perceptions, responses and the consequences on the prevailing balance of power between the primary powers. The spinoff from these nuclear weapons capabilities impinges seriously on India’s security.

It is in this context that the Indian Ministry of Defence [MOD], took note of the Chinese Government’s report to the 16th National Party Congress in November 2002, that strengthening of national defence is a “strategic task in China’s modernisation drive” in view of a serious disequilibrium in the balance of military power especially between the developed and developing countries. It has also reiterated that China’s continued occupation of approximately 38,000 sq Km of Indian territory in the Aksai Chin Area, its claims on yet another 90,000 sq Km in the Eastern Sector and the ceding of an additional 5,180 sq Km of territory in Northern Kashmir to it by Pakistan.[vi]

In its Annual Report 2002-2003 the MOD states – “As far as India is concerned, it cannot be ignored that every major Indian city is within reach of Chinese missiles and this capability is being further augmented to include submarine launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBMs]. The asymmetry in terms of nuclear forces is pronouncedly in favour of China and is likely to get further accentuated as China responds to counter the US missile defence programme.”[vii]

In these strategic parameters it is important to appreciate the developing nature and capabilities of China's Armed Forces and their potential to secure China’s national security interests. The military structure in China is divided into two broad categories - conventional and strategic nuclear forces, with present day dependence on the former as the nuclear force structure continues to evolve into a viable policy instrument.

The conventional forces, despite the ongoing modernisation, are comparatively dated in equipment and doctrine, and this state of affairs can be expected to last for a few more years before comprehensive upgrades of the entire structure becomes viable vis-à-vis technologically advanced modern military forces. However, the overall potency of the conventional forces has been substantially enhanced by the introduction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons [TNWs] and doctrinal changes in war fighting techniques that gives conventional forces the potential to operate offensively or defensively in a nuclear battlefield. `In 1984, ... the PLA conducted exercises simulating tactical nuclear warfare in at least nine out of the eleven military regions,' These exercises were conducted by simulating PLA offensives against an enemy holding defensive positions. Chong-Pin Lin, former Taiwanese minister for Main Land Affairs, concluded that `the PLA has been indoctrinated to perceive nuclear weapons, especially TNWs, as defensible, tactical nuclear warfare as fightable, and the human factor as still the decisive one in conventional or nuclear battles.'[viii] As a nuclear weapon state [NWS] with a major territorial dispute with the PRC this doctrine and force potential has to be factored into India’s Defence Policy at two levels.

First, at the tactical level because Beijing, while insisting that its nuclear weapons are exclusively ‘defensive’ in nature focused only on deterring the possibility of nuclear coercion by other NWS, has an added proviso that nuclear weapons have a role in preserving its sovereign territorial integrity, thereby extending their use in any military operation it may launch to wrest the territory it claims from India.

Second, at the strategic level to offset the asymmetry in the prevailing balance of nuclear capabilities to ensure that Beijing, or any other NWS, cannot fall back on nuclear blackmail to achieve its political objectives vis-à-vis India.

The Indian Government has noted with concern that China has created a comprehensive, fully indigenous, nuclear weapons programme. And that, while the modernisation programme in the armed forces is tailored within the existing fiscal constraints of the Chinese economy, the development and modernisation of nuclear forces continues unabated.

Elements Of China’s Nuclear Doctrine

As early as 1983, on the issue of nuclear weapons, Deng Xiaoping stated, “we must have what anyone else has, and anyone who wants to destroy us will be subject to retaliation,” an unambiguous declaration of nuclear deterrence. Even more explicit are Jiang Zemin’s “Five Musts” on nuclear weapons expounded at the Central Military Commission’s Conference in July 2000:
  1. China must own nuclear weapons of a definite quality and quantity in order to ensure national security.
  2. China must guarantee the safety of strategic nuclear bases and prevent against the loss of combat effectiveness from attacks and destruction by hostile countries.
  3. China must ensure that its strategic nuclear weapons are at a high degree of war preparedness.
  4. When an aggressor launches an attack against China, China must be able to launch nuclear counterattack and nuclear re-attack against the aggressor.
  5. China must pay attention to the global situation of strategic balance and stability and, when there are changes in the situation, adjust its strategic nuclear weapon development strategy in a timely manner. 
These are the basic essentials of China’s nuclear weapons doctrine. However they have been provided the necessary political-cum-pseudo strategic window dressing, elements that give the resultant nuclear strategy a degree of permissibility amongst the NWS and unsuspecting NNWS that are party to the global nonproliferation regime. The elements of its nuclear doctrine included in this category are:
  1. According to a press release by the Chinese Embassy in Moscow in 1998 “China has always opposed the policy of nuclear deterrence.” At all levels of Government, Beijing has been consistent in its objections to other states’ policy of nuclear deterrence and particularly critical of the policy of extended nuclear deterrence. When viewed in the context of Deng Xiaoping’s 1983 justification for China’s strategic retaliatory forces this argument loses its rationale. 
  2. China provides unconditional negative security assurances to NNWS and NWFZs. A useful sinecure to mitigate the concerns of NNWS at various nonproliferation conferences without in any way affecting Beijing’s nuclear strategy or initiatives at vertical proliferation in its arms race with the US – thus a robust nuclear weapon systems modernisation programme continues unfettered. 
  3. China has pledged not to target its nuclear weapons against Russia and the US. A perfectly logical declaration in the face of the reality of prevailing force asymmetries. But this is belied by the remarks made at the US Army War College in 1997 by the Vice President of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, Lieutenant General Li Jijun, that China’s strategy is “focused only on deterring the possibility of nuclear blackmail being used against China by other nuclear powers,” which should leave no doubt on Beijing’s targeting policy. Such pledges are for the gullible and those that wish to reduce the turbulence in the global nonproliferation regime.
  4. China, having completed a series of tests in 1995-96 has agreed to a moratorium on nuclear testing and has signed the CTBT but has refrained from ratifying it.[i] 
  5. China opposes the development and deployment of space-based weapons and missile defenses. Reports however suggest that one among many responses being considered by Beijing to deal with the US NMD and TMD threat is based on the concept of degrading the potential of the satellite network on which the efficacy of these two systems would be predicated. Research on satellite killers and related laser systems are well underway.[ii]

China’s Nuclear Weapons Philosophy

Objectives of Nuclear Strategy

Besides other political considerations, China developed a meaningful nuclear capability to gain recognition as one of the major powers of the world, and obtained her position along with the other four nuclear regimes as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This has greatly increased her leverage in the one world body that counts. Military potential, therefore, was crucial in China's attaining her primary interest - that of a great power status.

Next is China's aim to project herself as being equal with the US to preclude the possibility of intrusive diplomacy through nuclear coercion. While she is not yet at par with the US, the Chinese leadership has got a meaningful deterrent at its disposal and continues to expand this power base without let up. In the year 2004 China has started fielding strategic systems that have substantially reduced the prevailing divide. These satellite attack weapons to degrade the United States ballistic missile defence system (BMD)[i] and area denial ant ship missiles to deny United States aircraft carriers operation within 1,500 Km of China’s territories,[ii] and development of indigenous aircraft carriers,[iii] and so on.[iv]

In the regional context China perceives a need to retain a trump card for the eventuality that Japan may rescind her current pacifist policies for a military option and to maintain political and deterrent ascendancy over its regional nuclear rival - India.

China is extremely sensitive to the nuclear disposition of potential opponents. Russia and the US are eons ahead in the nuclear arms race and no amount of arms limitation accords are likely to alter that equation appreciably for quite some time.

Added to this Japan and India are causes for concern. Japan, while abjuring nuclear weapons, has stockpiled enormous amounts of plutonium, is a leader in fusion technology and has the capability to produce nuclear weapons at very short notice. The unpredictable nature of the security environment could constrain the Japanese to forego their aversion to nuclear weapons in deference to emerging national security interests, signs of which are beginning to surface in the ongoing missile standoff with North Korea. India is on the threshold of indigenously producing nuclear powered submarines, has successfully launched short and intermediate range missiles and has a substantiated ability to fabricate nuclear warheads. Beijing will find it mandatory to deploy an appropriate deterrent as she has done to secure herself vis-à-vis the US and the Russian Federation.

Additional factors that complicate formulation of a nuclear strategy for Beijing are:
  1. The altered nuclear equation brought about by the over night generation of nuclear armed States along China's Western borders. Albeit, States that have yet to come to internationally recognised territorial limits and ideologies. 
  2. States on China’s periphery, such as Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea are, universally recognised, nuclear technology threshold States. China’s proximity to these states makes her susceptible to these developments.
The world's third largest nuclear weapon power, China is unique in adopting a strategy to develop nuclear weapons in precedence to conventional weapons. Former Defence Minister Zhang Aiping, in an article in the Party Journal, Red Flag, had observed that "Defence funds should be concentrated upon those programmes which are badly needed and the most important areas which affect the overall situation such as strategic guided missiles and centres for producing nuclear fuels and bombs." Existing evidence suggests a greater spending on and securing of a `second strike' capability in terms of ICBMs, and a shift from a `minimum' to a `moderate' deterrence[i] of about 900 war heads.

China noted in its Defence White Paper 1995, major nuclear powers "have neither abandoned their policy of nuclear blackmail nor stopped their development of nuclear weapons and outer-space weapons, including guided-missile defense systems." The White Paper is critical of other NWS for "dumping their advanced weapons on the international market," "using weapon transfers as a means to interfere in other nations' domestic affairs," and "discriminatory anti-proliferation and arms-control measures.”  Consequently there has been no reduction in the allocation of funds, manpower or resources. The budget for its nuclear weapons has been constantly maintained at 5 percent of the overall defence expenditure.

Strategic Forces

China's nuclear aspirations originated prior to 1946 when `Kang Sheng, head of the Chinese secret service ... began systematic recruitment of Chinese nuclear and rocketry scientists.' The threat of nuclear blackmail posed by the US during the Korean war [1950-54] and again at Quemoy during the Taiwan crisis [1958], provided sufficient impetus to the compulsion to create and deploy a meaningful nuclear force structure.

The establishment of the Atomic Energy Research & Design Institute in 1956 marked the beginning of nuclear warhead production. Simultaneously China initiated a comprehensive programme to create a Triad of delivery means and a full fledged space programme, so that all aspects of a nuclear regime were properly constituted.

China first tested a nuclear device in 1964. This fission device was followed by detonation of a fusion [thermonuclear device] in 1967. Since then it has refined and miniaturised its nuclear devices to facilitate free dropping from fighter ground attack aircraft; delivery through a wide range of missile systems including MRBMs, IRBMs, ICBM, SLBMs and short range tactical missiles; utility as Atomic Demolition Munitions [ADMs]; and, battle field application through heavy and medium artillery pieces. China has shown considerable interest in the Enhanced Radiation Device [ERD] which would provide the wherewithal for tactical employment. According to one source the stockpile of nuclear warheads was estimated at 1245 in 1985, which amounted to approximately three times that of France.

At the turn of the century China fields a comprehensive triad of nuclear forces with the potential to strike strategic targets in Asia, Russia and the US. A plausible ICBM capability supplemented with an evolving SSBN fleet gives her strategic nuclear forces a global character. Some of the highlights of the delivery capability of the Chinese nuclear forces are: its SLBM was successfully launched on 12 October 1982; in 1981 China introduced the nuclear propelled Xia Class SSBN with the capability to launch 12 to 14 SLBMs, with an operational range of 1,853-2410 kilometres; and of a projected force level of 12 SSBNs six have already been commissioned. Finally a major spin off from the indigenous space programme is the enhancement of the capacity of individual missiles by virtue of an MIRV capability.

China's space programme has developed concurrently with her nuclear infrastructure and a lateral movement between the two is evident. Satellites have been launched by exploiting missile delivery systems developed indigenously. The ensuing space potential has been harnessed to further upgrade her nuclear delivery capacity both qualitatively and quantitatively.

By 1975 China had mastered the technology to recover satellites, developed suitable satellite guidance and control systems and had mastered the metallurgical problems to fabricate re-entry heat shields. This resulted in the competence to develop multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) and multiple independently - targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) which has induced an appreciable qualitative jump in China's nuclear weapons technological and military potential.

Strategic Force Modernisation

In the post Cold War environment the emphasis of Chinese threat perceptions shifted focus to the remaining super power the US bringing with it a need to modify its nuclear weapon doctrine and weapons capability. The US, on the other hand has started to put in a ballistic missile defence [BMD] system, which when it matures threatens to negate the deterrence capabilities that China fielded through its limited strategic forces. This in turn gave a new and added impetus for Beijing to qualitatively and quantitatively enhance its strategic nuclear forces to ensure that its deterrence competencies are relevant to the emerging strategic milieu. In the last decade of the 20th century Beijing has reconsidered its nuclear doctrine and is modernising its systems and structures to cope with this new threat.

The current status of Chinese strategic forces could be summarized as follows:

China has made, and continues to make, substantial gains in its growing missile capabilities to include: configuring new missile deployments on mobile launchers; sophisticated technological upgrades to enhance force potential through MIRV capabilities; and, testing new miniaturised war heads which is a critical dimension to configure in the MIRV role. This is that component of China’s strategic forces that has achieved a remarkable equitability amongst the major nuclear weapon states that has fundamentally changed the existing global nuclear weapons matrix. Modernisation and potential of China’s strategic missile forces is outlined in considerable detail later in this Paper.
  • China’s sea based nuclear weapon capabilities had run into problems, which appear to have come to the stage of maturity. The Jia Dong SLBM is still experiencing development hic-cups and is not yet operationally deployable. The present sea-borne component of the strategic nuclear forces is minimal and the US doubts the sustainability of this element of the Chinese Triad under crisis. US opinions in this regard need to be taken with a high degree of caution as there is a tendency to fine-tune existing information to suit its immediate national interests and allied policies before making public statements. China’s buildup in its submarine forces in recent years indicates that Beijing has made submarine warfare capabilities a top priority in its military buildup. U.S. intelligence disclosed that in July China deployed the first hull of a new class of strategic missile submarine known as the 094 Class that will carry the new JL-2 long-range missile.[i] "The survival of a single nuclear submarine can launch destructive retaliatory attack against the other side," the report stated. "Based on historical experience and lessons, the Chinese leaders of the second and third generations have attached great importance to the development of strategic nuclear submarine … The survival of a single nuclear submarine can launch destructive retaliatory attack against the other side," the report stated. "[ii] The lethality of the Chinese sub-surface fleet may be of a much greater magnitude than is commonly acknowledged, considering there is evidence of the development ofnuclear tipped torpedoes at the Lop Nor facility as early as the 1970s. “Despite its recent addition of the aircraft carrier Liaoning and other vessels, PLAN’s actual naval operational capabilities remain considerably behind those of the US, Japan and other western nations due to a lack of experience and training in conducting joint operations or to maintain air superiority over a battle zone at sea, believe military analysts.”[iii] 
  1. The airborne component of the Triad has major drawbacks. At this juncture it does not have a viable strategic capability and can only be used in what for the US would be peripheral tasking. The operational status of the current bomber assets is questionable as it is suffering from serious problems of engine and from severe limitations of penetration as no meaningful break through has been achieved in the development of stealth technology. However, China now has three IL-76 transports configured with Russian "balance beam" radar and is using them as command and control aircraft to enhance command and control, which includes, identifying targets and guide missiles, submarines and bombers to them.[i] New air force purchases and development programs with Russia have focused on power projection. As a result of these purchases, China was expected to have 300 Su-27s in operation by 2003 with a deal to co-produce, with Russia, 200 Su-27s in China by 2012. In the last quarter of 2004, Russian Air Force commander General Vladimir Mikhailov announced that "We could sell some Tu-22M3 and Tu-95 bombers [to China]. We will show them to our neighbor. ... If they have the money, let them buy," Mikhailov told reporters at a briefing, referring to the first-ever joint Russian-Chinese military maneuvers announced by Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov last month.[ii] The significance of all these purchases is underlined by the PLA Air Force's recent shift from a defensive strategic doctrine to one that emphasizes taking the offensive.
  2. The U.S. intelligence community’s latest assessment of global proliferation has cast fresh light on China’s WMD diplomacy. A report, released by the CIA, charges that –despite pledges to tighten export controls – the PRC “continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects” between July and December 2003. “Chinese entity assistance has helped Pakistan move toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs and… development of solid-propellant MRBMs,” as well as assisting “Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles,” according to the Congressionally-mandated study, Beijing’s proliferation activities do not stop there. “In addition,” the report reveals, “firms in China provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern-such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea.”[iii]
Modernisation of China’s Strategic Missile Capabilities

 However, the area of immediate concern centres on the modernization of the strategic missile forces with “The PLA Second Artillery Force [which] is a major strategic force for protecting China's security. It is responsible for deterring the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China, and carrying out nuclear counter-attacks and precision strikes with conventional missiles. By upgrading missiles, stepping up the R&D of missiles, …  the Second Artillery Force has built in its initial form a weaponry and equipment system that comprises both nuclear and conventional missiles, covers different ranges, and possesses markedly increased power and efficiency.”[i]

Western intelligence sources have long known of Beijing’s qualms about the diminishing credibility of its ‘strategic deterrent’ vis-à-vis the US and that the China Aerospace Corporation, the research institute of the Second Artillery Corps were in the process of modernizing the missile component of the Strategic Forces to reduce and eliminate the existing missile gap. These comprised of developing a new generation of Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles [ICBM], the Dong Feng 31 [DF-31] and Dong Feng 41 [DF-41] variants for the PLA Second Artillery to augment and subsequently replace the earlier generation CSS-3 and CSS-4, which were the mainstay of the PRC missile fleet. A sea-based variant of the DF-31, the new JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile [SLBM] has been concurrently developed, reports suggest that it has teething problems.

According to a statement in its Annual Report of World Militaries by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, China has deployed eight DF-31 long-range missiles. As late as 1998 the assessment of the US National Air Intelligence Centre was that this missile had not been tested. However, according to a source in Washington, the US Intelligence is quietly confirming that China has indeed deployed 12 DF-31 ICBMs. These new ICBMs are in addition to the 20-24 DF-5 liquid fuelled, silo based, 5 Megaton [MT] warhead missiles that were reportedly deployed at the turn of the century to cover targets on the American mainland – bringing the total to between 32 and 36.

Unconfirmed reports suggest that the Second Artillery Corps is expected to raise and equip 4 to 5 rocket battalions kitted with the DF-31 and all supporting structures and systems by 2008. The first such unit, 80304 battalion has its headquarters at Luoyang in Henan province.

The fundamental change it gives to the prevailing deterrence equation threatens to undermine the US strategic advantage seriously.

Development of this new missile started in 1978 and the first, though unsuccessful, flight tests are reported to have been conducted on 29 April 1992. The first successful flight test was conducted in 1995 and the DF-31 was paraded before the public on the 50th anniversary of the PRC on October 1, 1999. Later in November and December 2000 two live fire tests were conducted to coincide with the visit of the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton, to Nanjing for PLA war games.

The DF-31 is a solid-fuel, three-stage mobile missile with a range of 8000 kms, with a launch preparation time of 10-15 minutes.[ii] It is an effective strategic system that significantly increases the PRC’s nuclear strike capabilities. From the Chinese mainland it could reach all major towns on the West Coast of the US, all US military bases and forces operating in the Pacific, Indian oceans and targets in the whole of Europe, as also targets in Russia and India. Once the upgraded 12,000 km range DF-41 is deployed the whole North American Continent will fall in the foot-print of the PRC’s deterrent forces.

The DF-31 is fitted with endoatmospheric decoys, which would acutely dilute the efficacy of the ballistic missile defenses [BMD] system being put into place by Washington.[iii] The mobile configuration and minimized launch time would considerably increase its survivability against a ‘counterforce’ attack by the US or any other power. Limitations of the road mobile system could be neutralized by deployment on rail.

The DF-31 payload ranges between 1.050-1750 kg and could be uploaded with a single 1 MT yield warhead or up to 5 multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle [MIRVs] with a selectable yield of 20, 90 or 150 KT. China is known to have obtained at least basic design information on several modern US nuclear reentry vehicles, including the Trident II, through clandestine means from the US.[iv] In recent tests China has demonstrated its competence to field MIRVed ICBMs by having carried out a flight test of the DF-31 dispensing three dummy warheads. Either of these configurations makes it a potent force against ‘counter-value’ targets such as population centers, industrial complexes and ports.

Its inertial guidance system equipped with a stellar update system gives it the desired accuracy parameters. Based on the reported accuracy of 100 metres circular error of probability [CEP] some analysts have posited that the missile may be used in the ‘counter-force’ role to destroy hardened silos that house the rival’s nuclear tipped missiles. China is, however, unlikely to pursue this option, as it would require a force level of thousands of missiles to effectively neutralize all silos and that too without any guarantee. In view of Chinese economic priorities this is not a cost effective option. However, the DF-31 payload does give Beijing the scope of seriously degrading the electromagnetic spectrum on which inimical missile launches are contingent, by well placed electro magnetic pulse [EMP] attacks aimed at degrading satellite and ground based systems and communications. Besides giving targeteers a larger range of targets to engage, the MIRV capabilities would also enhance survivability in a limited NMD environment thus increasing the degree of difficulty for development and deployment of these defences.

Coupled with its sea-based variant the new JL-2 [CSS-NX-4] SLBM that has identical performance parameters as the DF-31, China is fast putting into place a strategic missile capability that will considerably diminish the existing missile gap and cause the US to review its nuclear weapon strategy.

Ripple Effect on regional & Global Security Environment

Chinese strategic nuclear force capability has broken out of its three decade old shell and while it continues to be a predominantly land based missile force that is fast changing.

This opens the Pandora’s box of nuclear weapons dynamics. There are many possibilities. One being that the US Space Command would gain impetus and space based defensive and offensive strategic capabilities will proceed beyond the doctrinal and drawing board stage. Japan, that depends heavily on the US nuclear umbrella and is a signed on partner with the US to develop and deploy a viable theatre missile defense [TMD], may review its national defense policy and the place for an indigenous nuclear deterrent. South Korea and Taiwan, who surrendered their advanced nuclear weapons programmes in the 1980s at the behest of the US, are likely to view the diminishing Sino-US missile gap as a threat to the latter’s autonomous capacity to guarantee the traditionally accepted nuclear umbrella – then what? The ripple effect of the Sino-US missile race is bound to have serious repercussions on Russian perceptions and responses as it would also on India.

India needs to enhance the potential of its strategic forces to ensure the credibility of its ‘minimum deterrence’ capabilities in keeping with the changing ‘deterrence environment’. Steps must be taken to: ensure operational continuity of the satellite assets supporting its strategic forces during conflict; harden strategic communications and systems from degradation through EMP effects; increase the strategic envelop of its existing missiles to 5,800 kms to cover deployment areas and possible targets throughout the Asian landmass and Indian Ocean; enhance survivability of its strategic forces by developing and deploying sub-surface strategic launch capabilities and means and infrastructure to improve the viability of its mobile land-based missile launch competencies; boost the prevalent penetration and deception capabilities of missiles to cope with defensive measures being instituted by other nuclear weapon powers; increase existing security systems and structures to safeguard human, technological, doctrinal and strategic assets from subversion and attack; And, last but not the least, identify and define policies that would insulate India’s autonomy to operate its strategic policies in the evolving ‘deterrence environment’ .

Conclusion

The PRC is undoubtedly the most significant player around whom the future security environment of the Asian Region will pivot. It is important for other Asian powers to accurately appreciate the emerging political character that will govern future policies, understand the critical sensitivities that may generate destabilising responses, technological and economic competencies and military capabilities of China, and identify the areas where reconciliation or compromises may be practicable before formulating their strategic policies.

The plethora of players, variables and discordant interests that will prevail in the Asian region are directly or indirectly connected with the future course of China’s policies and responses by the major players in keeping with their national interests. These are highly unpredictable and fluid circumstances over which a single player, its power quotient notwithstanding, cannot prevail. Furthermore the future security environment of the Asia Region cannot be fashioned without taking into account other players on other parts of China’s periphery as these seemingly extraneous issues would impinge:

·         Directly on the overall reactions by China;

·         Indirectly on the relationship of the regional state with the global powers generating undesirable nuances on policies being implemented elsewhere.

Tested paradigms are unlikely to work. The prevailing phenomenon requires a new approach wherein a heterogeneous group with a proportion of conflicting interests must work collectively to generate a stable security environment in which the well being of all is safeguarded. Individual state priorities will have to be harmonised to cater for the primary debilities of each - their individual power quotient notwithstanding. Inflexibility by any one player or attempts to capitalise on short-term opportunities would generate a negative ripple effect that would worsen an already difficult situation.

Political luminaries and strategic analysts in India are fast developing a penchant to classify India amongst the ‘major powers’ of the time. While undoubtedly there are economic, structural and systemic indicators of a growing potential of a major player in global affairs, New Delhi needs to be sensitive to the evolving capabilities and doctrinal thinking amongst the proven major powers to ensure its new capabilities continue to remain commensurate with the challenges posed by the emerging security environment.

The geopolitical and geo-strategic realities of the Sino-American missile race is fast changing the nature of the ‘deterrence environment’ in which India must play the part of a ‘major power’. The possession of nuclear warheads and a limited number of second-generation strategic missiles does not wholly meet the requirement of a ‘credible deterrent’ in the changed deterrence environment, and is fast being threatened by redundancy by the political and strategic developments amongst the major powers of the day.

Notes:
[1] White Paper: China’s National Defense in 2010. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China March 2010, Beijing

[1] Ibid.

[1] White Paper: China’s National Defense in 2004. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China December 2004, Beijing.

[1]  Ibid.

[1]  Chinese Military Power. Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. Harold Brown, Chair, Joseph W. Prueher, Vice Chair Adam Segal, Project Director

[1] Op.Cit. China’s National Defense in 2010.

[1] Ibid.

[1] Ibid.

[1] Ibid.

[1] Ministry of Defence Government of India Annual Report 2002-2003.

[1] Ibid. http://mod.nic.in/reports/MOD-English2003.pdf

[1] Chong-Pin Lin. China’s Nuclear weapons strategy: Tradition Within Evolution. Lexington M.A. Lexington Book 1998.

[1] Seth Faison. China Sets Off Nuclear Test, Then Announces Moratorium. July 30, 1996. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/30/world/china-sets-off-nuclear-test-then-announces-moratorium.html

[1] Wikipedia. 2007 Chinese anti-satellite missile test. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/inside-the-chin/

[1] Noah Shachtman. How China Loses the Coming Space War (Pt. 1). 01.10.08. Source: Danger Room Wired. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/inside-the-chin/

[1] China Reportedly Tests Antiship Ballistic Missiles. March 26, 2013. Global Security news Wire. http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/china-reportedly-tests-antiship-ballistic-missiles/

[1] Voice of Russia. An Aircraft Carrier's Relevance to China's A2/AD Strategy. 6 December 2012.

http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_01_10/Third-testing-of-China-s-anti-satellite-weapons/

[1] Dr. Chong-Pin Lin. Strait Talk. Defence Review Asia. Jan 17, 2012. China’s area access-denial capability. Cyberwarfare and China’s ability to shoot down satellites are also relevant points. “Area access denial relies on the pillar of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]. Beijing doesn’t talk about it but Washington understands...And China has a survivable second-strike capability – undersea and other launchers that are mobile – so that it’s hard to knock them out.” Defence Review Asia. http://www.defencereviewasia.com/articles/143/STRAIT-TALK-Dr-Chong-Pin-Lin-TAIWAN-S-FORMER-DEPUTY-DEFENCE-MINISTER

[1] By Dean Cheng. Chinese Views on Deterrence. Joint Force Quarterly 60 – 1st Quarter, January 2011. National Defence University. Washington. http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-views-on-deterrence.html

[1] China Unveils New Sub with 24 Long-Range Nuclear Missiles. Topix Local News China. February 12, 2013. http://www.topix.com/forum/world/china/T8FENR82LRQJ187RK

[1] ‘China's submarine buildup called strategic 'trump card' East-Asia-Intel, www.eas-asia-intel.com, February 15, 2005. East West Services, Inc.

[1] Ibid.

[1] East-Asia-Intel, March 1, 2005. http://www.east-asia-intel.com/eai/2005/03_01/2.asp

[1] Lyuba Pronina. Air Force to Offer Strategic Bombers to China. January 14, 2005, The Moscow Times.

[1] Copyright (c) 2004, American Foreign Policy Council. http://www.afpc.org

[1] Ibid.

[1] Federation of American Scientists - WMD

[1] Chinese Defence Today. February 02, 2005.

[1] House Report 105-851 - Report Of  The Select Committee On U.S. National Security And Military/Commercial Concerns With The People's Republic Of China Submitted By Mr. Cox Of California, Chairman
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<![CDATA[China’s Narrowing Missile Gap Enhances Its Leverage]]>Thu, 10 Feb 2005 06:24:44 GMThttp://www.sasfor.com/china-doctrine-and-deployment/chinas-narrowing-missile-gap-enhances-its-leverage
Dr. Nair retired from the Indian Army in 1991 after 30 years service, having been awarded the VSM for distinguished service. Besides three tenures of combat duty, in service experience includes: instructor - Defence Services Staff College, command of an Independent Armoured Brigade; and, Deputy Director General Strategic Planning at the Directorate of Perspective Planning at Army.   
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<![CDATA[Chinese submarines: the evolving need, means & strategy]]>Fri, 16 Jul 2004 02:58:22 GMThttp://www.sasfor.com/china-doctrine-and-deployment/chinese-submarines-the-evolving-need-means-strategy
Dr. Nair retired from the Indian Army in 1991 after 30 years service, having been awarded the VSM for distinguished service. Besides three tenures of combat duty, in service experience includes: instructor - Defence Services Staff College, command of an Independent Armoured Brigade; and, Deputy Director General Strategic Planning at the Directorate of Perspective Planning at Army. 

By Brig Vijai K Nair (Retd)

Feburary 15 2004

 “China's maritime strategy relies heavily on submarines to patrol the littorals, blockade the Taiwan Strait, and stalk aircraft carriers. The U.S. Navy should not underestimate China's ability to build a capable submarine force to challenge a superior maritime foe.” Dr. Lyle Goldstein and Lieutenant Commander Bill Murray, U.S. Navy.

China's National Defense In 2004, a White Paper promulgated in December 2004 provides valuable pointers elucidating Beijing’s national security concerns that drive its evolving strategic thought and policies – present and future – for the management of strategic forces. In the perceptions of the Communist Party of China, “The current international situation continues to undergo profound and complex changes ... New changes are occurring in the balance of power among the major international players, with the process of their realignment and the redistribution of their interests accelerated … Tendencies of hegemonism and unilateralism have gained new ground, as struggles for strategic points, strategic resources and strategic dominance crop up from time to time.”  
China’s declared National Defense Policy hinges on “step[ping] up modernization of its national defense and its armed forces, to safeguard national security and unity, and to ensure the smooth process of building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way … China sticks to keeping its development in pace with its security and makes great efforts to enhance its national strategic capabilities by using multiple security means to cope with both traditional and non-traditional security threats so as to seek a comprehensive national security in the political, economic, military and social areas.”

As a consequence, the National Defense Paper has arrived at the conclusion that, “The military factor plays a greater role in international configuration and national security … The role played by military power in safeguarding national security is assuming greater prominence.” And, therefore, “The PLA [Peoples Liberation Army] will promote coordinated development of firepower, mobility and information capability, enhance the development of its operational strength with priority given to the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and strengthen its comprehensive deterrence and warfighting capabilities.”

It is in this context that “The PLA Navy [PLAN] is responsible for safeguarding China's maritime security and maintaining the sovereignty of its territorial seas along with its maritime rights and interests. The Navy has expanded the space and extended the depth for offshore defensive operations. Preparation for maritime battlefield is intensified and improved while the integrated combat capabilities are enhanced in conducting offshore campaigns, and the capability of nuclear counter-attacks is also enhanced. In accordance with the principle of smaller but more efficient troops, the PLA Navy compresses the chain of command and reorganizes the combat forces in a more scientific way while giving prominence to the building of maritime combat forces, especially amphibious combat forces. It also speeds up the process of updating its weaponry and equipment with priority given to the development of new combat ships as well as various kinds of special-purpose aircraft and relevant equipment … and long-range precision strike capability raised.” [China’s National Defense 2004]

To compensate for the lack of air craft carriers for projection of maritime forces along the sea lines of communication [SLOC] and the necessity to enhance the survivability of China’s limited strategic forces to augment its nuclear deterrent, Chinese maritime strategy, has perforce, turned to the creation and deployment of a potent sub-surface force. This has resulted in the PLAN having acquired a large submarine fleet, which has – and continues to be – modernized to meet the challenge of holding its own in seas dominated by the navies of the Western powers.

East-Asia-Intel, a news service that focuses on East Asian affairs, reported on February 15, 2005; “China is building up its submarine forces as a key strategic element of its military power and a ‘trump card’ weapon in any future conflict.” The Report refers to an analysis dated December 16, 2004 by a Chinese specialist Kao Hsin-tao. He stated that “submarine forces are the main weapons to be used in a possible conflict across the Taiwan Strait. …” This has to be seen in the context of the strategic compulsion to deter US aircraft carrier task forces from approaching within 500 kilometres of Taiwan – leave alone the luxury of operating in the Taiwan Straits with impunity as was done in 1995-96.

Kao Hsin-tao is reported to have highlighted the potential of submarine mounted strategic forces to significantly offset the existing vulnerability of land-based strategic forces. He goes on to draw attention to the fact that, “fixed missile sites have a low survivability rate in conflict, with fixed sites having a 4 to 9 percent rate and mobile missiles a 30 percent ratio. Submarine based missiles, however, have an estimated survivability of 90 percent.” The report states, “The survival of a single nuclear submarine can launch destructive retaliatory attack against the other side." And notes "Based on historical experience and lessons, the Chinese leaders of the second and third generations have attached great importance to the development of strategic nuclear submarine (s)."

Having determined the nature of its tasking the PLAN put into place a development strategy that would eventually give it the types of submarines to fulfill its commitments in the larger framework of Beijing’s defense strategy. Alongside its efforts to develop diesel technology submarines the PLAN has been developing a range of nuclear submarines, which can launch ballistic missiles against the continental US; engage superior naval forces along its periphery; provide appropriate protection to its maritime assets at the far reaches of its strategic SLOC; and, deter air craft carrier Task Forces from intrusive action that could jeopardize Beijing’s territorial integrity. Patrick Devenny, National Security Fellow at the Center for Security Policy Washington recognizes  this as “a highly developed stratagem which seeks to counter large American naval forces with advanced submarine capabilities.

China’s Submarines

The PLAN’s past, present and future inventory comprises of the following submarines:[1]

Type 094, NEWCON SSBN – displacement 8,000 tons
Type 092 XIA SSBN – displacement 6,500 tons
Type 093 NEWCON – displacement 6,500 tons
Type 091 Han SSN – displacement 5,500 tons
Kilo Cla [Russian] – displacement 2,325 tons
Type 039-A Yuan – displacement not known
Type 039 Song – displacement 2,250 tons
Type 035 Ming – displacement 2,100 tons
Type 033 Romeo – displacement 1,710 tons
Type 032 Whisky – displacement 1,350 tons
Type 031 Golf SSB – displacement 2,700 tons
Wuhan – displacement 2,100 tons

China capitalized on Soviet assistance it received before relations between the two soured in 1960. Having acquired substantial design, technological and material capacities China created its submarine building competencies. After the Soviet withdrawal Chinese shipyards continued to produce submarines based on the Soviet Whiskey Type 03 and Romeo Type 33 class designs. By 1975 over 100 had been produced. This submarine force was configured into 3 fleets and was restricted to coastal operations only.

After the Sino-US reconciliation in 1972 Beijing gained access to comparatively modern equipment from western sources. Using Western systems China was able to design and produce a new series of modern diesel submarines resulting in the production of the Ming Type 035 classe – based on the hull design of its Romeo Type 033. The first two Ming submarines were launched in 1975. 19 boats were built but these suffered from serious safety problems resulting in two major accidents.

In the early 1990s China developed the Song 039 the first hull of which started sea trials in 1995. After the initial teething problems of integrating systems acquired from diverse sources the PLAN finally inducted the Song 039 which is the quietest indigenously produced diesel submarine in service. These have been successfully equipped with the submarine-launched version of the YJ-8 (C-801) series anti-ship sea-skimming missile in the 1990s. With five already in service it is reported by ‘Chinese Defence Today’ that at least another 5 indigenously developed Type 039 Song class are under construction at Wuhan and Jiangnan Shipyards.

The break through in its diesel operated submarine fleet came in 1996 when it contracted for four state of the art Kilo Class submarines from Russia. Two export type 877 and two upgraded 636s, that are in the Indian and Iranian Navies. In May 2002 China contracted for eight additional Kilo class submarines, which incorporate upgraded weapon systems including the versatile and potent Klub missile system.  On delivery China would be fielding a total of 12 Kilo Class submarines, which in conjunction with the Song Class will provide the PLAN with a potent under-sea defense capability on its littoral.

On June 9, 2005, Bill Gertz reported in the Washington Times that the, “Deployment of a new attack submarine known as the Yuan class that was missed by U.S. intelligence until photos of the submarine appeared on the Internet.” This diesel-electric submarine appears to be a completely new design displaying some features of the Russian Kilo Class boat such as size, general performance and a tear-drop shaped hull with a raised hump on top. There is evidence of two boats being in existence each having been launched on May 31, 2004 and December 2004. These are possibly pre-production prototypes undergoing evaluation trials.

Parallel to the development of the diesel submarines China launched an ambitious programme to develop nuclear powered submarines as early as the 1950s. The first generation – Han SSN Type 091 class attack submarine started sea trials in 1971 and entered operational service in 1974. A total of five were produced and appear to be in service to date.

Having mastered the technology and design aspects of nuclear propulsion under water China proceeded to design and deploy its first generation of strategic submarines by which it could deploy nuclear armed ballistic missiles to enhance its nuclear deterrent. In 1981 the first of two Xia Type 092 SSBNs was launched and became fully operational in 1988. The original boat that was armed with 12 JL-1 SLBMs has since been retrofitted with the new JL-2 [CSS-NX-4] SLBM. According to newspaper reports one of two Xia SSBNs produced was lost during missile launching trials leaving one in service.

The Type 094 submarine scheduled to become operational in 2005, will form the primary component of China’s sub-surface nuclear deterrent. It is “designed to emulate the small acoustic signature of the most modern Russian Typhoon designs, able to infiltrate foreign waters quietly and launch nuclear tipped missiles.”[2] This is the latest development that incorporates some Russian technology and is the replacement for the outdated Xia Class SSBN with a more reliable propulsion system. This SSBN will be armed with 16 JL-2 –DF-31 submarine launched ballistic missiles [SLBM] configured with 1, 3 or 6 warheads having a range of 8000 Kms. The JL-2-DF-31, having undergone successful tests has been retrofitted on the single Xia SSBN in service. While China is creating its submarine forces and support infrastructure the SSBN fleet is likely to restrict its operational radius to secured seas in proximity of the Chinese coastline giving them a potential to hold about three-fourths of the United States at risk. However, when suitably deployed in the Pacific and Indian Oceans it would threaten targets across the US on the East and all areas extending to and inclusive of the Middle East and parts of Europe to its West.

The PLAN has also begun to deploy a second generation nuclear attack submarine, the Type 093-SSN, similar to Russian second generation designs such as the Victor III. It has been compared to the US Los Angeles class submarine in terms of overall performance.[3] This submarine is reported to have been undergoing sea trials since late 2002. 093-SSNs are being armed with the latest in Russian naval weaponry, such as the Type 65/DT/DST 92 torpedo, which was specifically developed to destroy American aircraft carriers. An even more disturbing development is the Chinese acquisition from Kazakhstan of the Shkval super-cavitating torpedo, which are reported to be three to four times faster than any torpedo fielded by Western naval forces. The PLAN’s expanded submarine fleet will also wield highly advanced anti-ship missiles, which could challenge and even defeat the U.S. Navy’s famed AEGIS defense system.[4] It is expected to deploy submerged-launch anti-ship cruise missiles, possibly a follow-on to the C801s, as well as the projected Land Attack Cruise Missile. There is, however, no information about nuclear-armed torpedoes that were reportedly being developed and tested at Lop Nor in the late 1960s-70s – a potential that cannot be ignored in any analysis of China’s submarine strategy.

Conclusion

By 2010 the PLAN will be deploying 12 Kilo class, 10-15 Song class, and 2-5 Yuan class diesel-electric submarines, as well as 2-4 Type 093 SSN and 1-2 Type 094 SSBN.

Overcoming these challenges is a time consuming and resource heavy operation. An ability to produce and field combat platforms is one thing. But to manage these effectively is quite another. China will take at least a decade before it is in a position to exploit the full potential of the formidable submarine potential.
_________________________________________________________________________________________


Notes:
[1] Sources: (i) Federation of American Scientists “Weapons of Mass Destruction – China”. (ii) “Yuan Class Diesel-Electric Submarine.” Chinese Defence Today Updated: 9 February 2005.

[2] Patrick Devenny. China's Growing Military Might. FrontPageMagazine.com, June 3, 2005

[3] Ibid.

[4] Source: Federation of American Scientists “Weapons of Mass Destruction – China”

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<![CDATA[China’s Strategic Capabilities Doctrine, Concept & Force Structures - Part II]]>Wed, 04 Jun 2003 03:39:53 GMThttp://www.sasfor.com/china-doctrine-and-deployment/chinas-strategic-capabilitiesdoctrine-concept-force-structures-part-ii
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<![CDATA[China’s Strategic Capabilities Doctrine, Concept & Force Structures Part I]]>Sun, 30 Mar 2003 06:07:04 GMThttp://www.sasfor.com/china-doctrine-and-deployment/chinas-strategic-capabilities-part-i
Dr. Nair retired from the Indian Army in 1991 after 30 years service, having been awarded the VSM for distinguished service. Besides three tenures of combat duty, in service experience includes: instructor - Defence Services Staff College, command of an Independent Armoured Brigade; and, Deputy Director General Strategic Planning at the Directorate of Perspective Planning at Army.  

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<![CDATA[Chinese Nuclear Capabilities Deployed In Tibet]]>Mon, 19 Feb 2001 08:46:05 GMThttp://www.sasfor.com/china-doctrine-and-deployment/chinese-nuclear-capabilities-deployed-in-tibetSino-Indian Conflict  Assessment [2]
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<![CDATA[The Chinese Syndrome: India’s Sword Of Damocles]]>Fri, 05 Jan 2001 06:42:39 GMThttp://www.sasfor.com/china-doctrine-and-deployment/the-chinese-syndrome-indias-sword-of-damoclesSino-Indian Conflict  Assessment [1] 
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<![CDATA[Security of The Asia Pacific Region]]>Tue, 10 Jun 1997 05:11:40 GMThttp://www.sasfor.com/china-doctrine-and-deployment/security-of-the-asia-pacific-region
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